The War Against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and the Third Amendment by Foley, Elizabeth Price
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2015 
The War Against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and the 
Third Amendment 
Elizabeth Price Foley 
Florida International University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth Price Foley, The War Against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and the Third Amendment , 
82 Tenn. L. Rev. 583 (2015). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications/408 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, 
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Jul 13 12:43:26 2020
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
			                                                                
Elizabeth Price Foley, The War against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and the
Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 583 (2015).                                        
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Elizabeth Price Foley, The War against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and the
Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 583 (2015).                                        
APA 7th ed.                                                                          
Foley, E. (2015). The war against crime: Ferguson, police militarization and the
third amendment. Tennessee Law Review, 82(3), 583-594.                               
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Elizabeth Price Foley, "The War against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and
the Third Amendment," Tennessee Law Review 82, no. 3 (Spring 2015): 583-594          
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Elizabeth Price Foley, "The War against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and
the Third Amendment" (2015) 82:3 Tenn L Rev 583.                                     
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Foley, Elizabeth Price. "The War against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and
the Third Amendment." Tennessee Law Review, vol. 82, no. 3, Spring 2015, p. 583-594.
HeinOnline.                                                                          
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Elizabeth Price Foley, 'The War against Crime: Ferguson, Police Militarization and
the Third Amendment' (2015) 82 Tenn L Rev 583
Provided by: 
FIU College of Law
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
   Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
THE "WAR" AGAINST CRIME: FERGUSON, POLICE
MILITARIZATION AND THE
THIRD AMENDMENT
ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 583
II. WHEN DID POLICE START ACTING LIKE SOLDIERS? ....... . . . . . . .. . 584
III. DOES THE THIRD AMENDMENT BIND THE STATES? ................. 590
IV. WHAT DOES "SOLDIER" MEAN?.. ........ ............... 592
V. CONCLUSION ........................................ 594
I. INTRODUCTION
The shooting death of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown by
Ferguson, Missouri police officer Darren Wilson has sparked a
renewed national conversation about the militarization of police.
While Officer Wilson's deadly encounter with Brown did not involve
militarized force, subsequent protests, looting, and riots have
triggered the display and use of armored vehicles, M4 assault rifles,
Humvees, Kevlar vests, grenades, camouflage, and other military-
style equipment by state and local police.' U.S. Attorney General
Eric Holder criticized the police response, asserting, "At a time when
we must seek to rebuild trust between law enforcement and the local
community, I am deeply concerned that the deployment of military
equipment and vehicles sends a conflicting message."2 Holder's
comment-and the civil unrest in Ferguson-evinces a broader
societal concern about the changing role and increasing firepower of
police.
In an era when police seem to be "at war" with drugs and crime
generally, are they essentially becoming local "soldiers"? This
question, in turn, raises interesting questions about the applicability
of the Third Amendment that declares, "No soldier shall, in time of
* Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law.
1. See Niraj Chokshi, Militarized Police in Ferguson Unsettles Some; Pentagon
Gives Cities Equipment, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2014, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/militarized-police-in-ferguson-unsettles-some-pentagon-
gives-cities-equipment/2014/08/14/4651f670-2401-11e4-86ca-6f03cbdl5cla-story.html; see
also Jamelle Bouie, The Militarization of the Police, SIATE (Aug. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/politics/2014/08/policein-ferguson-milit
ary weaponsthreaten-protesters.html.
2. Josh Levs, Ferguson Violence: Critics Rip Police Tactics, Use of Military
Equipment, CNN.COM (Aug. 15, 2014), available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/14/
us/missouri-ferguson-police-tactics/.
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peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." 3
Depending on whom one asks, the Third Amendment is either
the most or least successful portion of the Bill of Rights. As Professor
Glenn Reynolds put it recently, "I often tell my constitutional law
students that the Third Amendment is the only part of the Bill of
Rights that really works-because there are almost no cases of
troop-quartering."4 But as Reynolds also acknowledges, the paucity
of Third Amendment litigation likely belies workability, reflecting
instead a deep uncertainty about the scope and meaning of the
amendment itself.5
Part I of this article will examine the nature and extent of police
militarization, and why such militarization likely plays a role in
minority communities' protests-such as those in Ferguson,
Missouri-about the excessive use of force by state and local police.
It will also examine a couple of recent cases that suggest that the
Third Amendment may have relevant application to civil rights
lawsuits involving militarized force. Part II will explore whether the
Third Amendment is binding on the States as well as the federal
government. Finally, Part III will consider the meaning of the word
"soldier" and its potential application to state and local police.
II. WHEN DID POLICE START ACTING LIKE SOLDIERS?
The genesis of the warrior-cop phenomenon lies with the so
called "War on Drugs," which began in earnest in the 1980s. In the
1989 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress created a
program that allowed the U.S. Department of Defense to transfer
military equipment to local and state police departments to aid in
their counterdrug efforts.6 By 1996, the program-renamed the 1033
Program-was expanded to allow for the sale of military equipment
to aid in counterterrorism efforts as well.7
3. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
4. Glenn Harland Reynolds, Uphold the Third Amendment, USA TODAY, July
7, 2013, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinioni/2013/07/07/third-amend
ment-henderson-nevada-police-column/2496689/.
5. Id.
6. Am. Civil Liberties Union, WAR COMES HOME: THE ExCESSIVE
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 16 (June 2014) (hereinafter WAR COMES
HOME), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jusl4-warcomes
home-report-web-rell.pdf.
7. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 2576a (2012).
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The equipment is given to state and local police for free, though
they do have to pay for any costs of the transfer itself.8 Any
equipment "excess to the needs of the Department of Defense" may
be transferred,9 and thirty-six percent of the property transferred
under the 1033 Program is new.10 The program to date has
transferred over $4.3 billion worth of military equipment to state
and local police since its inception."
The military equipment transferred under the 1033 Program is
used principally by Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams for
drug interdiction. Indeed, a recent study by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) found that sixty-two percent of SWAT
deployments for which it had obtained data were for drugs
searches,12 and sixty-one percent of all drug-related SWAT raids
impacted minorities.13
The 1033 Program, in addition to several post 9/11 grant
programs designed to combat the "War on Terror,"14 have, in the
words of Senator Rand Paul, "incentivized the militarization of local
police" by helping them "build what are essentially small armies
.. . ."15 The militarized police response to the Ferguson protests and
riots triggered congressional hearings and bipartisan concerns,16 as
well as the formation of an executive branch "Task Force on 21st
Century Policing" to ascertain whether these federal programs need
reform.'7 The task force's goal, in President Obama's words, is "to
make sure that we're not building a militarized culture inside our
local law enforcement."'8
The concerns about police militarization are substantial. Police
are charged with keeping communities safe and arresting criminals
that pose a risk to others, consistent with individuals' constitutional
8. 10 U.S.C. § 2576a(b)(4)-(c) (2012).
9. 10 U.S.C. § 2576a(a)(1)(B) (2012).
10. WAR COMES HOME, supra note 6, at 24.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2, 31.
13. Id. at 36.
14. See id. at 16-17 (describing the Justice Assistance Grant Program and the
Homeland Security Grant Program).
15. Rand Paul, We Must Demilitarize the Police, TIME, Aug. 14, 2014, available
at http://time.com/3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/.
16. See Tim Devaney, Senators Blast DOD Program that 'Militarized Police,"
THEHILL.COM (Sept. 9, 2014), available at http://thehill.com/regulationI217136-
senators-blast-dod-program-to-militarize-police.
17. See David Jackson, Obama Team Calls for New Rules on Police Equipment,
USATODAY.COM (Dec. 1, 2014), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2014/12/01/obama-ferguson-police-equipment/1
9 7 360 8 1/.
18. Id.
5852015]
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rights. Soldiers on a battlefield are not restrained by these same
constitutional norms; their mission is to capture or kill the enemy.
Samuel Adams, objecting to quartering of British soldiers in Boston
to enforce the laws, explained the danger:
It is moreover to be observ'd that military government and
civil, are so different from each other, if not opposite, that
they cannot long subsist together. Soldiers are not govern'd
properly by the laws of their country, but by a law made for
them only: This may in time make them look upon
themselves as a body of men different from the rest of the
people; and as they and they only have the sword in their
hands, they may sooner or later begin to look upon
themselves as the LORDS and not the SERVANTS of the
people: Instead of enforcing the execution of law, which by
the way is far from being the original intent of soldiers, they
may refuse to obey it themselves: Nay, they may even make
laws for themselves, and enforce them by the power of the
sword!9
Using military personnel to enforce ordinary laws is
incompatible with civil government, in Adams' view, because of two
factors: (1) the sheer power they possess-the "power of the sword";
and (2) their status as warriors normally unmoored from ordinary
law--subject only to the distinct "law of war." These two
characteristics increase the potential for tyranny and convinced
Adams that the use of military forces to enforce law was
inappropriate.
If police begin to view their job as "war," it transforms ordinary
criminals, such as drug dealers or users, into "enemies," encouraging
and even necessitating a degree of force that may be excessive for
ordinary law enforcement purposes. This, in turn, exacerbates
tensions in high-crime communities where such tactics are most
often used, amplifying the perception of such communities as "war
zones" and an attitude of "us" versus "them."
A few examples will help illustrate this growing phenomenon. In
May 2014, in the predawn hours, a Habersham County, Georgia
Sherriffs SWAT team executed a "no knock" warrant on a home,
battering down the door and throwing a disorienting "flash-bang"
grenade into the room.20 The grenade landed in the crib of a
19. Samuel Adams, BOSTON GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1768, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., 1987),
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/amendIIs2.html.
20. See David Beasley, Deputies Who Flashbanged Toddler Bounkham
Phonesavanh Avoid Charges, HUFFINGTONPOsT.COM (Oct. 6, 2014), available at
586 [Vol. 82:583
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nineteen-month-old boy, exploded in his face, and severely burned
him as a result.2 1 The search warrant was designed to look for
evidence of methamphetamines allegedly sold by the toddler's
cousin, who no longer lived at the home.22 The search yielded no
drugs or arrests.23 The family had no health insurance,
24 and the
boy's hospitalization cost an estimated $800,000.25 A grand jury
refused to indict the officers on any criminal charges, but it issued a
fifteen-page report recommending that SWAT teams' raids of homes
be used only when absolutely necessary, when other methods of
arrest cannot be effected.26 If the "war on drugs" was not viewed as a
"war," would such excessive, military-style tactics have been
employed in the attempt to arrest a single drug dealer?
Consider also the case of seventy-five year-old Roger Hoeppner,
whose multi-year zoning battle with the town of Stettin, Wisconsin,
resulted in the town levying an $80,000 civil judgment against
him.2 7 To collect the judgment, the town dispatched twenty-four
police officers and an armored military truck to Hoeppner's home.
28
When asked by reporters why military force was used to collect
money from an elderly man, a Sherriff's spokesman stated that
while Hoepnner was not believed to be dangerous, he had been
"argumentative" and refused to exit his home.
29 The spokesman
glibly stated that the armored truck was a useful show of force and
that "[p]eople may not always understand why, but an armored
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/06/flashbanged-toddler-bounkham-phone
savanh-n_5943098.html.
21. Id.
22. See Tina Chen, Baby in Coma After Police "Grenade" Dropped in Crib
During Drug Raid, ABCNEWS.COM (May 30, 2014), available at http://abcnews.go
.comfblogs/headlines/2014/05/baby-in-coma-after-police-grenade-dropped-in-crib-
during-drug-raid/; see also WAR COMES HOME, supra note 6, at 14.
23. WAR COMES HOME, supra note 6, at 14.
24. See Chen, supra note 22.
25. See Beasley, supra note 20.
26. See Jacob Sullum, Georgia Grand Jury Rejects Criminal Charges Against
Drug Warriors Who Burned and Mutilated a Toddler, REASON.COM (Oct. 6, 2014),
available at http://reason.com/blog/2014/10/06/georgia-grand-jury-rejects-criminal-
char.
27. See Robby Soave, 24 Armed Cops and a Military Truck Dispatched to Take
Money from an Old Man, REASON.COM (Oct. 24, 2014), available at http://reason.com/
blog/2014/10/27/24-armed-officers-and-a-military-truck-d.
28. Id.
29. See Bruce Vielmetti, Armored Vehicle Helps Collect Judgment in Small
Town, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 2014, available at http://www.js
online.com/news/wisconsinlarmored-vehicle-helps-collect-civil-judgment-in-small-tow
n-b99376798zl-280427872.html.
5872015]
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vehicle is almost a necessity now."30 This statement reveals that the
police in a Wisconsin small town see a "necessity" for military-style
force that ordinary people-us versus them-cannot understand.
Similar excessive militarization was displayed in Kenosha,
Wisconsin, in the summer of 2013, when nine state Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) officers and four deputy sheriffs-all
"armed to the teeth . . . like a SWAT team"--descended upon a no-
kill animal shelter.31 What was the crime that warranted such a
show of force? Possessing a baby deer, whom the shelter volunteers
had named Giggles.32
When a reporter inquired why the DNR did not simply call the
shelter and ask them to turn over the fawn, the DNR spokesperson
arrogantly responded, "If a sheriffs department is going in to do a
search warrant on a drug bust, they don't call them and ask them to
voluntarily surrender their marijuana or whatever drug that they
have before they show up."33 The attitude revealed by this statement
is patent: police must always use force, not seek cooperation, to do
their job of law enforcement.
Cases such as these show that local and state law enforcement
officers, armed with military force, too often use force first, and
think later. This should not be surprising: If taxpayers, through
various federal programs such as the 1003 Program, give state and
local police shiny, powerful military-grade "toys," they will naturally
want to use them, sometimes inappropriately. These overkill
situations sometimes result in federal civil rights lawsuits against
the officers involved, usually asserting a Fourth Amendment claim
that the search or seizure was unreasonable.34 But beyond the
Fourth Amendment, some recent situations suggest that militarized
police tactics might also raise viable Third Amendment claims under
the right circumstances.
For example, in February 2014, Deborah Franz of Jacksonville,
Florida was told to leave her home by a SWAT team that was
responding to a domestic violence situation in a mobile home across
30. Id.
31. See Jesssica Chasmer, 13 Wisconsin Officials Raid Animal Shelter to Kill Baby
Deer Named Giggles, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, available at http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/1/13-wisconsin-offcials-raid-animal-shelter-kill-bal.
32. Id. Wisconsin law makes possession of wildlife unlawful. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Radley Balko, "Why Did You Shoot Me? I Was Reading A Book: The New
Warrior Cop is Out of Control, SALON.COM (July 7, 2013), available at http://www.salon.
com/2013/07/07/%E2%80%9Cwhy did-you shoot-me i was-readinga bookthenew_w
arriorcop-is~outLofLcontrol/.
588 [Vol. 82:583
THE "WAR" AGAINST CRIME
the street.35 Frantz left her home for six hours, returning to find her
belongings had been tampered with and drapes pulled down.
36 She
called the Jacksonville Sherriff's Office to complain and was told
that SWAT officers had indeed entered her home without her
permission, as a "tactical approach" to quell the nearby domestic
disturbance.37
Similarly, in July 2011, an officer of the police department in
Henderson, Nevada, phoned Anthony Mitchell, informing him that
police needed to occupy Mitchell's home to gain a "tactical
advantage" in observing a domestic violence situation involving a
neighbor.38 Mitchell refused, saying he did not want to get involved,
but officers came to his home anyway, without a warrant, banging
on Mitchell's door and ordering him to open. An alarmed Mitchell
decided to call his mother, but seconds later, officers broke down his
door with a battering ram, told Mitchell to lie face down, and called
him an "asshole."39 Officers then fired several pepperball rounds at
Mitchell and his dog, handcuffed Mitchell, and arrested him for
"obstructing a police officer."40 Officers searched Mitchell's home and
occupied his house to surveil his neighbor.41 Mitchell subsequently
brought a federal civil rights lawsuit, alleging violations of his Third
and Fourth Amendment rights.42
The Frantz and Mitchell cases indicate that state and local
police, using military-style tactics and weaponry, may raise not only
the more obvious Fourth Amendment claims but also potentially
Third Amendment claims for "quartering" of "soldiers" in peacetime
without the consent of premises' owners. The viability of such Third
Amendment claims, however, rests principally on two legal
questions: (1) Does the Third Amendment bind the States?; and (2) If
so, does the amendment's reference to "soldier" encompass police?
35. See SWAT Team Took Over Innocent Woman's House Without Permission to
Investigate Neighbor, POLICESTATEUSA.COM (Feb. 9. 2014), available at http://www.
policestateusa.com/2014/swat-team-took-innocent-womans-house-without-permission/.
36. Id.
37. See Homeowner Says SWAT Came in Her Home Without Permission,
ACTIONNEWSJAX.coM (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.actionnewsjax.com/
videos/news/homeowner-says-swat-came-in-her-home-without/vCP8C8./.
38. See Jacob Gershman, "Forgotten" Third Amendment Surfaces in Nevada
Case, WALL ST. J. LAw BLOG (July 5, 2013), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2013/07/05/forgotten-third-amendment- surfaces-in- nevada-case/.
39. See Complaint ¶¶ 20-25, Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No.
2:13-cv-01154-APG-CWH, 2015 WL 427835 (D. Nev. 2015).
40. Id. ¶¶ 27-34.
41. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
42. Id. 1 1.
5892015]1
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III. DOES THE THIRD AMENDMENT BIND THE STATES?
The Supreme Court has used a "selective incorporation"
approach to the Bill of Rights, deciding on a clause-by-clause basis
whether the Bill's guarantees are binding on state (and municipal)
governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 While this process of incorporation has made the bulk
of the Bill of Rights binding on the States, it has not made all of
them so, and provisions such as the Fifth Amendment's right to
indictment by grand jury 4 4 and the Seventh Amendment's right to a
civil jury trial45 have been denied incorporation. The Supreme Court,
however, has never ruled on the incorporation of the Third
Amendment.
Only one lower federal court has ruled on the Third
Amendment's incorporation. Specifically, in Engblom v. Carey, a
Second Circuit panel unanimously agreed with the district court
judge that the Third Amendment was binding on the States.46 At
issue in Engblom was the constitutional propriety of the forcible
eviction of state prison guards from their on-site residence during a
union strike, and subsequent quartering of National Guard troops
therein.47 The court noted that "except perhaps when 'federalized' by
unit under [federal statutes]," the National Guardsmen were "state
employees under the control of the Governor," thus necessitating a
ruling as to whether such state-controlled Guardsmen were subject
to the Third Amendment-in other words, whether the amendment
was incorporated to the States.48
The Engblom court reasoned that because the amendment was
"designed to secure a fundamental right to privacy"-and was,
indeed, one of the amendments that formed the "penumbras" and
"emanations" of the right to privacy recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticut49-it qualified as an integral component of due process
43. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010).
44. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
45. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
46. 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982). The Engblom decision was 2-1, but Judge
Kaufman's separate opinion made clear that he agreed that the Third Amendment
should be incorporated. Id. at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ('I do not disagree with the majority that the Third Amendment should be
incorporated into the Fourteenth for application to the states.").
47. Id. at 960.
48. Id. at 961.
49. See id. at 962 (citing Griswold and stating, "The Third Amendment was
designed to ensure a fundamental right to privacy."); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The Third Amendment, in its prohibition
590 [Vol. 82:583
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and was accordingly binding on the States pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
50
The Engblom court's analytical framework for ascertaining
whether a provision of the Bill of Rights qualifies for incorporation
was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in McDonald v.
City of Chicago.5 1 Specifically, in McDonald, the Court stated that
the question of incorporation hinges upon "whether a particular Bill
of Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty
and system of justice"52 because the right is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."53 In holding that the Second
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms qualified for
incorporation, the McDonald Court reasoned that the right to self-
defense had long been considered by both Englishmen and American
colonists as a basic liberty, essential to preventing tyranny.
54
The history of the Third Amendment reveals that it is deeply
rooted in our nation's history and tradition. The Quartering Acts of
1765 and 1774, enacted by the British Parliament, required
American colonists to quarter British soldiers in various places such
as inns, taverns, stables and private homes when necessary,
55 and
even furnish them "with diet, and small beer, cyder, or rum mixed
with water, by the owners of the inns, livery stables, alehouses,
victualing houses, and other houses in which they are allowed to be
quartered and billeted by this act. . . ."6
These acts proved so objectionable that, among the grievances
against King George III catalogued in the Declaration of
Independence was that he "has kept among us, in times of peace,
Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures" and
"[q]uartering large bodies of armed troops among us."
57 The Third
against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent
of the owner, is another facet of that privacy.").
50. See, e.g., id. at 968 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Judge Sweet properly concluded that the Third Amendment is incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as one of the 'fundamental'
rights 'rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people' and thus 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."').
51. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
52. Id. at 764 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 767 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 767.
54. Id. at 767-70.
55. See Engblom, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
56. The Quartering Act of 1765, available at http://www.ushistory.org/
declaration/related/quartering.htm; see also The Quartering Act of 1774, available at
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/q74.htm.
57. THE DECIARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
5912015]1
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Amendment was designed to prevent such atrocities in the newly
formed United States, securing, in Joseph Story's words, "that great
right of the common law, that a man's house shall be his own castle,
privileged against all civil and military intrusion."58
Given this long and important history of the Third Amendment,
it would seem that its protections against nonconsensual quartering
in times of peace-or quartering without legislative consent in
wartime-would qualify for incorporation, and thus bar such
quartering of state "soldiers," such as the National guardsmen in
Engblom.
IV. WHAT DOES "SOLDIER" MEAN?
Even assuming Engblom was correct that the Third Amendment
is binding upon the States, the question still remains: Other than
National Guard troops, what state actors should be considered
"soldiers" within the meaning of the amendment? Unfortunately,
there is no obvious answer to this question.
The most obvious meaning of the word "soldier" is someone who
serves as a member of the military or militia, such as the Army or
National Guard. Founding era dictionaries suggest a potentially
broader definition of soldier, encompassing any sort of "warrior" who
is part of a hierarchical group of fighting men, which could
presumably include members of a police force. For example, Samuel
Johnson's 1785 Dictionary of the English Language defined soldier
as "a fighting man; a warriour [sic]" and noted "it is generally used
of the common men, as distinct from the commanders."59
Yet when one looks up the definition of "warriour"-a word
derived from the word "war"-it becomes clear it was understood to
be restricted to members of the military. Johnson's 1785 dictionary
defines warriour as "a soldier; a military man."6 0 It seems reasonable
58. JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1893 (1833).
59. SAMUEL JOHNSON, 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 682 (6th ed.
1785), available at https://archive.org/stream/dictionaryofenglO2johnuoft#pageln681
/mode/2up; accord THOMAS SHERIDAN, 2 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
BOTH WITH REGARD TO SOUND AND MEANING 399 (4th ed. 1797), available at
https://archive.org/stream/completedictiona02sheriala#page/n399/mode/2up; see also
NOAH WEBSTER, AM. DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), available at
http://webstersdictionaryl828.com/.
60. 2 JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 1031, available at
https://archive.org/stream/dictionaryofenglO2johnuoft#page/nlO31/mode/2up; accord
2 SHERIDAN'S DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 566, available at https://archive.org/
stream/completedictiona02sheriala#page/n565/mode/2up.
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to conclude, therefore, that at the time of the Third Amendment's
ratification, the term "soldier" denoted a member of the military.
One potential weakness of this line of argument is that police
were unknown at the time of the Third Amendment's ratification in
1791. Formal police departments did not exist in the U.S. until the
mid-1800s, when several large cities such as New York, Chicago, and
Los Angeles formed unified police forces.61 Because the Third
Amendment's applicability to the States would occur, if at all, via
incorporation grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, the salient moment in time for ascertaining the meaning of
the word "soldier"-as applied to the States-would arguably be
1868, not 1791.
If this is the case, it is conceivable that the word "soldier" could
encompass the state and local police. By1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, formalized police forces were in place in
most major American cities, and like members of the military or
militia at the time, these police possessed the basic characteristics of
"warriors" or "soldiers": They wore uniforms, carried revolvers, and
were organized in a hierarchical fashion.62
While there is ample evidence that those who wrote and ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment believed the amendment would make
the Bill of Rights-including the Third Amendment-binding on the
States,63 there is no evidence regarding what they believed the word
"soldier" might mean, in the specific context of state law
enforcement. The question for an originalist, therefore, would be
whether the fact that police officers shared basic characteristics with
military "soldiers"-carrying weapons, wearing uniforms,
hierarchical organizational structure-is sufficient to consider them
"soldiers" within the meaning of the Third Amendment.
The answer would appear to be "no." The raw power of police
the "power of the sword" as Samuel Adams put it64-was not really
comparable in 1868 to the raw power of the military. While police in
1868 had clubs and revolvers, they did not have cannons and other
heavy military artillery. While police today undoubtedly have
military-style weaponry, this would not be salient to an originalist
interpretation of the Third Amendment, though it admittedly would
be salient to a living constitutionalist.
61. See CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, POLICING: A TEXT/READER 5 (Sage Publications,
2013).
62. Id. at 5-6.
63. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 826-38 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (cataloguing the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause).
64. See Adams, supra note 19.
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Moreover, the other concern noted by Samuel Adams-namely,
the fact that soldiers are "not govern'd properly by the laws of their
country, but by a law made for them only"65-i.e., the law of war-is
also not a concern that is applicable to state and local police. Unlike
the military, police are subject to ordinary laws, including the
Constitution. They are not "outside" or "above" the ordinary law.
Police who violate laws or the Constitution can find themselves
criminal or civil defendants, accountable pursuant to normal legal
principles. In this sense, the risk of tyranny perceived by Adams-
his motivation for objecting to the quartering of British soldiers-is
not as high from police as it is from the military.
While there are compelling normative arguments for making
state and local police accountable through the Third Amendment, an
originalist would be hard-pressed to justify such a result, given that
the word "soldier" undoubtedly denoted a member of the military,
who possessed unique power and legal insularity that police did not
possess in either 1791 or 1868. If the problems posed by increasing
police militarization are going to be effectively addressed, therefore,
they will need to be addressed by either a constitutional amendment
or, more likely, statutory and regulatory reform.
V. CONCLUSION
State and local police are becoming increasingly militarized.
Providing billions of dollars' worth of military equipment to police is
encouraging them to adopt increasingly aggressive methods of
dealing with ordinary crimes, creating a potentially
counterproductive, war-like atmosphere in many high-crime
communities. While this is undoubtedly a problem in need of a
solution, stretching the meaning of the Third Amendment-
particularly its use of the word "soldier"-to include police should
not be an attractive option for constitutional originalists. This does
not mean, however, that the American people are powerless to stop
the trend of police militarization and excessive force; quite the
contrary. It simply means that, if the problem is going to be
addressed, it should be addressed through other constitutional
provisions such as the Fourth Amendment, or normal republican
processes uch as statutory reform.
65. Id.
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